ECONOMETER

Please see below an extract from my forthcoming book Chronology of a Crisis (Searching Finance 2012).

The departure of Greece from the Euro is by no means a forgone conclusion but if it happens it is not clear that global policy makers have much ammunition left to shield markets from the resulting fallout.

Stimulus after stimulus has only left governments increasingly indebted. The price of such largesse is now being paid in the form of higher borrowing costs. Even central banks do not have much ammunition left. Admittedly further rounds of quantitative easing, and central bank balance sheet expansion may help to shore up confidence but the efficacy of such policy actions is questionable. Moreover, policy support may only help to buy time but if underlying structural issues are not resolved pressure could resume quickly.

Against this background Europe is under intense pressure and there is little time left before it results in something catastrophic for global markets via a disorderly break up of the Eurozone. EU leaders and the European Central Bank (ECB) have to act to stem the crisis. However, at the time of writing the ECB under the helm of Mario Draghi is steadfastly refusing to provide further assistance to the Eurozone periphery either directly via lower interest rates or securities market purchases or indirectly via another Long term refinancing operation (LTRO). Any prospect of debt monetization as carried out already by other central banks including the Fed and Bank of England is a definite non-starter. The reason for this intransigence is that the ECB does not want to let Eurozone governments off the hook, worrying that any further assistance would allow governments to slow or even renege upon promised reforms.

Whether this is true or not it’s a dangerous game to play. The fact that the previously unthinkable could happen ie a country could exit the Eurozone should have by now prompted some major action by European officials. Instead the ECB is unwilling to give ground while Germany continues to stand in the way of any move towards debt mutualisation in the form of a common Eurobond and/or other measures such as awarding a banking license to the EFSF bailout fund which would effectively allow it to help recapitalize banks and purchase peripheral debt. Germany does not want to allow peripheral countries to be let off the hook either, arguing that they would benefit from Germany’s strong credit standing and lower yields without paying the costs.

To be frank, it’s too late for such brinkmanship. The situation in The Eurozone is rapidly spiraling out of control. While both the ECB and Germany may have valid arguments the bottom line is that the situation could get far worse if officials fail to act. As noted above there are various measures that could be enacted. Admittedly many of these will only buy time rather than fix the many and varied structural problems afflicting a group of countries tied together by a single currency and monetary policy and separate fiscal policies but at the moment time is what is needed the most. Buying time will allow policymakers to enact reforms, enhance productivity, reform labour markets, increase investment funds etc. Unfortunately European policy makers do not appear to have grasped this fact. Now more than at any time during the crisis much depends on the actions of policy makers. This is where the major uncertainty lies.

If officials do not act to stem the crisis, economic and market turmoil will reach proportions exceeding that of even the Lehmans bust.